Governing for the long term : democracy and the politics of investment / Alan M. Jacobs.
Material type:
TextPublication details: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011.Description: xiv, 306 p. : ill. ; 24 cmISBN: - 9780521195850
- 9780521171779
- 331.25
- HN 28 J29g 2011
| Item type | Current library | Home library | Collection | Shelving location | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Barcode | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Libro
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Biblioteca Juan Bosch | Biblioteca Juan Bosch | Ciencias Sociales | Ciencias Sociales (3er. Piso) | HN 28 J29g 2011 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 1 | 1 | Available | 00000103471 |
Includes bibliographical references (p. 269-293) and index.
Problem and theory. The politics of when -- Theorizing intertemporal policy choice -- Programmatic origins : intertemporal choice in pension design. Investing in the state : the origins of German pensions, 1889 -- The politics of mistrust : the origins of British pensions, 1925 -- Investment as political constraint : the origins of U.S. pensions, 1935 -- Investing for the short term : the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965 -- Programmatic change : intertemporal choice in pension reform. Investment as last resort: reforming U.S. pensions, 1977 and 1983 -- Shifting the long-run burden : reforming British pensions, 1986 -- Committing to investment : reforming Canadian pensions, 1998 -- Constrained by uncertainty : reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001 -- Conclusion. Understanding the politics of the long term.
"This book examines how democratic governments manage long-term policy challenges, asking how elected politicians choose between providing policy benefits in the present and investing in the future"-- Provided by publisher.
"In Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking"-- Provided by publisher.
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