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Governing for the long term : democracy and the politics of investment / Alan M. Jacobs.

By: Material type: TextTextPublication details: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2011.Description: xiv, 306 p. : ill. ; 24 cmISBN:
  • 9780521195850
  • 9780521171779
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 331.25
LOC classification:
  • HN 28 J29g 2011
Online resources:
Contents:
Problem and theory. The politics of when -- Theorizing intertemporal policy choice -- Programmatic origins : intertemporal choice in pension design. Investing in the state : the origins of German pensions, 1889 -- The politics of mistrust : the origins of British pensions, 1925 -- Investment as political constraint : the origins of U.S. pensions, 1935 -- Investing for the short term : the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965 -- Programmatic change : intertemporal choice in pension reform. Investment as last resort: reforming U.S. pensions, 1977 and 1983 -- Shifting the long-run burden : reforming British pensions, 1986 -- Committing to investment : reforming Canadian pensions, 1998 -- Constrained by uncertainty : reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001 -- Conclusion. Understanding the politics of the long term.
Summary: "This book examines how democratic governments manage long-term policy challenges, asking how elected politicians choose between providing policy benefits in the present and investing in the future"-- Provided by publisher.Summary: "In Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking"-- Provided by publisher.
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Holdings
Item type Current library Home library Collection Shelving location Call number Vol info Copy number Status Barcode
Libro Libro Biblioteca Juan Bosch Biblioteca Juan Bosch Ciencias Sociales Ciencias Sociales (3er. Piso) HN 28 J29g 2011 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) 1 1 Available 00000103471

Includes bibliographical references (p. 269-293) and index.

Problem and theory. The politics of when -- Theorizing intertemporal policy choice -- Programmatic origins : intertemporal choice in pension design. Investing in the state : the origins of German pensions, 1889 -- The politics of mistrust : the origins of British pensions, 1925 -- Investment as political constraint : the origins of U.S. pensions, 1935 -- Investing for the short term : the origins of Canadian pensions, 1965 -- Programmatic change : intertemporal choice in pension reform. Investment as last resort: reforming U.S. pensions, 1977 and 1983 -- Shifting the long-run burden : reforming British pensions, 1986 -- Committing to investment : reforming Canadian pensions, 1998 -- Constrained by uncertainty : reforming German pensions, 1989 and 2001 -- Conclusion. Understanding the politics of the long term.

"This book examines how democratic governments manage long-term policy challenges, asking how elected politicians choose between providing policy benefits in the present and investing in the future"-- Provided by publisher.

"In Governing for the Long Term, Alan M. Jacobs investigates the conditions under which elected governments invest in long-term social benefits at short-term social cost. Jacobs contends that, along the path to adoption, investment-oriented policies must surmount three distinct hurdles to future-oriented state action: a problem of electoral risk, rooted in the scarcity of voter attention; a problem of prediction, deriving from the complexity of long-term policy effects; and a problem of institutional capacity, arising from interest groups' preferences for distributive gains over intertemporal bargains. Testing this argument through a four-country historical analysis of pension policymaking, the book illuminates crucial differences between the causal logics of distributive and intertemporal politics and makes a case for bringing trade-offs over time to the center of the study of policymaking"-- Provided by publisher.

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