000			02816nam a2200409 a 4500
999			_c115206 _d115206
003			BJBSDDR
005			20230411090720.0
007			cr -n---------
008			120625s2014 enka rb 001 0 eng d
020			_a9781107420328 (pbk.)
020			_a1107420326 (pbk.)
035			_a(CKB)2550000000709600
040			_aMiAaPQ _cMiAaPQ _bspa
041			_aeng
050	1	4	_aHG 3893 _b A432i 2014
082	0	0	_a332/.042
100	1		_aAllen, William A.
245	1	0	_aInternational liquidity and the financial crisis / _cWilliam A. Allen.
260			_aCambridge ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c2014.
300			_a255 p.: _bill.; _c24 cm
336			_atext _btxt
337			_acomputer _bc
338			_aonline resource _bcr
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0	0	_gIntroduction -- _tThe domestic liquidity crisis in the USA -- _tInternational liquidity crises outside of the USA -- _tEffects on financial markets outside the USA -- _tThe theory of central banking before the crisis and the practice of central banking during the crisis -- _tSwap lines -- _tWhich countries received swap lines? -- _tDid the swap providers achieve their objectives? -- _tHow did the swap lines affect the recipients? -- _tPropagation and scale of the 1931 crisis -- _tThe management of the 1931 crisis -- _tA comparison of 1931 and 2008 -- _tInternational liquidity management.
520			_aIn the ongoing financial crisis, policy makers have for the most part appeared to be reactive, formulating emergency solutions as events unfold. However, in contrast to their performance during the Great Depression, central banks around the world, led by the Federal Reserve, acted decisively following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and provided huge injections of liquidity into the financial markets, thereby preventing a far worse outcome. International Liquidity and the Financial Crisis compares the 2008 crisis with the disaster of 1931 and explores the similarities and differences. It considers the lasting effects of the crisis on international liquidity, the possibilities for an international lender of last resort, and the enlargement of the International Monetary Fund after the crisis. It shows that there is no clear demarcation between monetary and macro-prudential policies, and discusses how central banks need to adapt to a new environment in which global liquidity is much scarcer.
546			_aEnglish
650		4	_aCrisis financiera _91793
650		4	_aCrisis financiera global, 2008-2009 _9408
650		4	_aLiquidez internacional _916427
655		4	_aElectronic books.
776			_z1-107-42032-6
776			_z1-107-03004-8
906			_aBOOK
942			_2lcc _cBK